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Articles
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE DoEs NoT PERMIT CouRT To UsE TIME
SPENT IN PRETRIAL DETENTION IN COMPUTING STATUTORY PREDICATE THAT
DEFENDANT MusT HAvE SERVED "AT LEAST ONE TERM oF CoNFINEMENT oF
AT LEAST

180 DAYS IN A CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION."
By Donna Novak

I. INTRODUCTION

The notion that the sentence a defendant receives
upon conviction depends on the judge at sentencing is well
settled Nicknames like "Maximum Bob" have been used
to describe members ofthe bench and are a testament to
the fact that justice, in all its forms, is not an exact science.
While judicial discretion is a recognized component ofthe
criminal justice system, a lesser known, but equally compelling, aspect ofthe judicial process is prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion is especially apparent in
mandatory sentencing provisions, particularly as they relate to repeat violations of controlled dangerous substance
laws.
Whether a defendant receives a mandatory sentence
depends, not upon the judge before who he appears, but
upon the discretion of the prosecutor trying the case.
Mandatory sentencing provisions must be invoked by the
prosecutor in order to take effect. When a prosecutor
exercises discretion and invokes the mandatory penalties
provided by the statute for third-time felony drug offenders, the defendant is imprisoned for a mandatory twentyfive years without parole.
The use of mandatory sentencing in drug cases has
come under increased scrutiny by members of the legal
community and by the general public. There is growing
concern over statutorily prescribed discretion given to
prosecutors and the questionable effectiveness of these
laws intended to curtail escalating national drug epidemic.
As of June 30, 1998, there were 1,277,866 inmates in
state and federal prisons, 1 with 60% of inmates in federal
prisons, and 23% of inmates in state prisons serving sentences for drug violations. 2 Because ofa general increase
in the use ofharsh, punitive, "tough on crime" policies, a
significant portion ofprisoners are serving mandatory sen-

tences. 3
There has been an increase in the number of"threestrikes" laws,4 designed to ensure that repeat offenders
are incarcerated for mandatory, minimum sentences. 5
"Since Washington State pioneered the concept in 1993,
twenty-two other states have passed some form of threestrikes law."6 There has been an increase in the number of
minimum sentencing laws in every state/ in addition to
almost sixty such statutes under federal law. 8 As seen in a
number of other jurisdictions,9 Maryland has enacted
mandatory sentencing provisions. 10
Maryland's repeat drug offenders are subject to
prosecutorial discretion when sentenced under Article 27,
section 286(d) ofthe Maryland Code. 11 When a prosecutor invokes the mandatory penalties provided by the
statute, 12 offenders must be imprisoned for a mandatory
25 years without parole. 13 Rather than removing discretion from the sentencing stage, 14 mandatory sentencing
statutes shift the discretion from judge to prosecutor. 15
Section 286(d), 16 which provides a mandatory sentence
of25 years, can only be imposed when a state's attorney
has served notice to the defendant, or his counsel, of the
intention to invoke an enhanced sentence. 17
Discretionary sentencing provisions are being displaced by determinate sentencing schemes and mandatory enhanced sentences. 18 Mandatory sentencing statutes continue to be a topic ofdebate in the legal community, 19 and have led to a number of sentencing issues. In
Melgar v. State, 20 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
addressed the issue of the time spent by a defendant in
pretrial detention. The court examined whether pretrial
detention may be considered when computing the statutory predicate that a defendant serve "at least 1 term of
confinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a previous" drug felony
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conviction, before he can be subject to a mandatory enhanced penalty under Article 27, section 286(d). 21 In·
Melgar, the court found that Maryland's sentence enhancement provision did not permit the court to add any
time spent in pretrial detention on to time served postconviction. 22 The court concluded that to do otherwise
would be inconsistent "with the Legislature's desire to
accord to a defendant a true opportunity and fair chance
at rehabilitation before being sentenced under the enhanced
penalty statute.''23
This article first examines the court ofappeals' decision in Melgar by tracing the historical development of
sentence enhancement provisions for drug offenses, emphasizing Maryland law. 24 Next, the article will discuss the facts and the Court's decision inMelgar. 25 This
article will then address the implications ofthe court's determination in Melgar on the legislature's goal to accord
offenders a "fair chance at rehabilitation in the prison system.''26 Finally, this article examines theMe/gar decision
in the wake of present debates over mandatory and enhanced sentencing provisions and their success at deterring crime.27
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The History ofMandatory Sentencing Laws
In the 1970's, Congress began to assume a more
active role in defining sentencing goals and practices.28 In
1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act. 29
Congress codified the purpose and objective behind sentencing by specifying the kinds ofsentences that could be
imposed, and by establishing the factors to be considered. 30 The Sentencing Reform Act created the United
States Sentencing Commission.31 The Commission was
authorized to further the Sentencing Reform Act's objectives, including working towards eliminating sentencing
disparities, and helping ensure fair punishment.32
Throughout the nation there has been a gradual displacement ofdiscretionary sentencing by determinate sentencing schemes and mandatory enhanced sentences. 33
While determinate sentencing "directs judges to a whole
complex of factors,''3 4mandatory sentencing "emphasizes
a single aggravating factor.'' 35 Mandatory sentence enhancement laws "require substantially increased punishment when a specified aggravating circumstance exists in
31.2 U. Bait L.F. 4

connection with the commission of a crirne.''36 Critics argue that mandatory sentencing is "applied unevenly, with
those exercising their right to trial often receiving harsher
penalties.''37
Mandatory sentencing statutes "generally provide that
when a specified circumstance exists in connection with
the commission ofa crime (1) the court must sentence the
defendant to prison and (2) the duration ofthe defendant's
incarceration will be substantially longer than it would have
been in the absence ofthe circumstance.''38While requiring an enhanced punishment for various felonies, the laws
focus particularly on violent crimes and drug trafficking.39
By enacting mandatory sentencing laws, both federal and
state legislatures are attempting to send a message to habitual offenders: those who continue to commit specific
drug offenses and other violent crimes may receive mandatory sentences without the possibility ofparole. 40 The
principal purposes ofmandatory sentencing laws are deterring crime and imprisoning and punishing serious offenders.41 To this end, legislatures use one of two approaches -- charge-based sentencing or conduct-based
sentencing.42
Charge-based sentencing "requires courts to impose
mandatory punishment only when the prosecution has alleged the facts triggering the sentencing provisions as part
ofthe charging instrument and has proven them at trial, or
the defendant has admitted them."43 It provides prosecutors with a bargaining chip to force the defendant to plead
guilty to any terms the State may dictate. 44
Conduct-based sentencing "directs the court to determine the facts that trigger the mandatory minimum sentence at the time of sentencing, even ifthey have not been
alleged in the charging instrument and proven at trial. "45
While charge-based sentencing requires formal charges
containing factual allegations that trigger mandatory sentencing, conduct-based sentencing imposes the enhanced
sentence regardless ofthe charges. 46
B. Maryland's Statute Imposing Enhanced Penalty in Drug Offenses
Maryland's statute is a charge-based sentencing law,
requiring two prior felony drug convictions, as well as a
mandatory confinement of 180 days for at least one prior
felony conviction. 47 Article 27, section 286 ofthe Maryland Code mandates specific punishments for the unlaw-
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ful manufacture, distribution, and possession of certain
controlled dangerous substances.48 Section286(d), added
to the statute in 1988, specifically provides that an individual who has two prior drug convictions,49 where the
convictions do not stem from the same incident, and the
individual has served at least one term of confmement of
at least 180 days on a conviction,50 shall be sentenced to
a term ofnot less than 25 years without parole. 51
Introduced in the General Assembly in 1982, section 286 was intended to impose "mandatory sentences
for persons previously convicted ofcertain offenses relating to the manufacture or distribution of controlled dangerous substances and altering the penalties for certain
offenses relating to the manufacture or distribution ofcertain controlled dangerous substances."52 Repealed and
then reenacted with amendments in 1988, the revised section specified that "for the purpose of certain subsequent
offender penalties, certain offenses are prior offenses,"53
and it prohibited the suspension of certain penalties. 54
While stylistic changes have been made over the last eleven
years, the effect of section 286 has changed little. 55
Through the language in section 286, the Maryland General Assembly drew a distinction between second offenses and third and fourth offenses. 56 The Legislature did not intend to simply assign a more severe punishment on a repeat offender. 57 Ifso, then the statute would
have provided for an enhanced sentence every time a defendant had a previous conviction.58 Rather, the Legislature provided that, in addition to the requirement that the
defendant has two prior convictions, the defendant must
also have served 180 days confmement in a correctional
institution.59
III. MELGAR v. STATE

A. The Facts of the Case
In Melgar v. State,60 the Court ofAppeals ofMaryland considered whether the time a defendant spent in
pretrial detention may properly be considered under the
statute imposing an enhanced penalty on drug defendants
who had two prior drug convictions and had served at
least 180 days ofterm of confinement in a correctional
institution, imposed as a result of previous drug convictions. 61 The court held that the required 180 days of confmement could not include time spent by a defendant in

pretrial detention for prior narcotic violations.62
In July 1997, Jose Emondo Melgar was indicted by
the Grand Jury for Prince George's County on the following counts: 1) possession ofcocaine with intent to distribute; 2) possession of cocaine; 3) making a false statement
to a police officer; and 4) resisting arrest. 63 Melgar was
found guilty on all four counts.64 Because he had two previous drug convictions under section 286(b),65 the State
served notice informing the Defendant ofits intention66 to
seek mandatory sentencing under section 286(d). 67 The
State intended to produce evidence ofMelgar's two previous drug convictions, and the concomitant term of incarceration he had served for those convictions, as the
basis for the State's decision to invoke an enhanced sentence.68
At the time ofsentencing, Melgar did not dispute the
fact ofhis first two convictions, nor did he contest that he
had served a single term of confinement of248 days as a
result ofhis prior drug convictions.69 When the sentencing court found that the State had satisfied the requirements of the statute, the Defendant was sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison without the possibility of parole.70
A timely appeal was made to the Court of Special
Appeals ofMaryland. 71 On appeal, Melgar argued that
he did not qualify for the three-time drug offender enhanced sentence. 72 He argued that the State had failed to
demonstrate that he had served the required 180-day term
of confinement under section 286(d)(l)(i)Y Melgar
claimed that he had not served the required 180 days as a
result of a previous conviction under section 286,74but
only 141 days, thereby not qualifying for the enhanced
penalty. 75 When arrested on the 1996 charge, Melgar
was unable to make bail, and spent 107 days in pretrial
detention. 76 At sentencing, the trial judge gave him credit
for these 107 days toward his sentence. 77 The Court of
Special Appeals ofMaryland held that "the 180-day term
of confinement mandated by section 286(d)( 1)(i) implicitly includes pretrial detention served in relation to the same
underlying, qualifying offense."78 The Court ofAppeals
ofMaryland granted Melgar's petition for a writ of certiorari.79
Melgar argued that his pretrial detention had been
improperly considered by the trial court when computing
his term of confinement. 80 Melgar claimed that the I 07
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days ofpretrial detention could not coilllt toward the statutory 180-day period. 81 He argued that he was not detained "as a result of conviction" as is required under section 286(d), but was being held because he had been illlable to post the required bail. 82 Melgar argued that the
fact that the sentencing court "gave him credit for the 107
days of pretrial incarceration, cannot convert into time
served as a result of a conviction. " 83
The State countered, arguing that Melgar's prior
convictions resulted in a sentence of one year and one
day, and acknowledged that Melgar did receive credit for
the 107 days that he had served in the pretrial detention. 84
Therefore, Melgar's actual time of confinement was 248
days. 85 The State's argument was based on an interpretation of section 286(d)(l )(i), that both the actual time of
confinement and the pretrial detention time should coilllt
toward the statutory 180-day requirement. 86 The State
suggested that Melgar's argument was not legitimate since
he had already benefited from having this time credited to
his sentence. 87 The State argued that Melgar could not
have it both ways- benefit from the time served in pretrial
detention, while not having it coilllt towards prior time of
confinement
B. Statutory Interpretation
In Melgar, the court of appeals was faced with interpreting the Legislature's intent and determining the meaning ofthe provision requiring "at least one term ofconfinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institution as a
result of a conviction of a previous conviction. " 88 In its
review of the statute, the court noted that Art. 27, section
286(d)( 1)(i), mandating 25 years incarceration without
parole illlder certain conditions, is highly penal, and as
such required that the court strictly construe the statute. 89
The court applied the rule oflenity, as is proper any time
there is a question as to the punishment imposed by statute.90
The court reaffirmed the rule that ''where the General Assembly has required or permitted enhanced pilllishment for multiple offenders, the burden is on the State
to prove, by competent evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of all ofthe statutory conditions
precedent for the imposition of enhanced pilllishment. ''9 1
The court concluded that the language "as a result of a
conviction" was clear and illlambiguous. 92 The 180-day
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requirement of section 286(d) did not permit the addition
of time spent in pretrial detention because this time was
not "as a result ofa conviction.''93 The court distinguished
the section, which considers time served "as a result of a
conviction," from section 638C, which permits the granting of credit against a sentence for "time spent in custody."94 The court noted the stylistic differences of the
two statutes, as well as the Legislature's deferring purposes in enacting them. 95
C.Application ofJones v. State
Both parties inMelgarrelied on the holding in Jones
v. State to support their interpretation ofArt. 27, section
286(d) of the Maryland Code. 96 In Jones v. State, 97 the
court considered ''whether the State had proved the necessary predicate for the enhanced pilllishment imposed
upon Jones. "98 The court held that a finding that the 180day mandatory time predicate has been met cannot be
based merely on the fact that a defendant had been sentenced to more than 180 days, even ifthe defendant had
been sentenced to one year ofilllsuspended time. 99 The
burden remains on the State to show that the defendant
did in fact serve at least 180 days. 100
In Melgar, the State argued that "even though [the
Jones] court refused to permit the cumulating of confinements for separate convictions or incidents to satisfy the
180-day requirement" the [Jones] court "did not rule out
totaling the entire period of confinement with respect to a
single charge and conviction." 101 The State relied on a
statement in Jones that "Jones was given credit for time
served [in pretrial detention]" which effectively started "the
term ofconfmement" at the moment Jones' pretrial detention began. 102 The State argued that this statement established a rule permitting pretrial detention time to be used
to compute the required 180 days under section
286(d)( 1)(i). 103
On the other hand, Melgar argued that the issue of
the significance ofthe words "as a result of conviction,"
was not before the Jones court. 104 In fact, Melgar suggested that the court "lend little credence to a one sentence dictum upon which the State would hinge our present
analysis." 105
The Jones court did not answer the question of
whether the words "as a result of conviction" meant time
served in pretrial detention. 106 The court held that trial
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courts may not fmd that the State has met its burden of
proofby merely showing that the defendant had been sentenced to one year ofunsuspended time without showing
that the required time had, in fact, been served. 107
Significantly, the Jones court noted that the legislative intent in section 286(d)( 1)(i) was rehabilitative. 108 ''By
imposing the 180-day minimum, the purpose ofthe statute was to ensure that those who received the enhanced
punishment had been accorded a fair chance at rehabilitation in the prison system and had not responded." 109 But
the Jones court made it very clear that the phrase "term of
confinement" meant time actually served. 110
D. Strict Construction in the Context of a Penal
Statute
Section 286 ofArticle 27 ofthe Maryland Code, is
an enhanced penalty statute. 111 Because "an enhanced
penalty statute is by nature highly penal," it ''must be strictly
construed. " 112 The court of special appeals has interpreted
strict construction of a penal statute, as meaning, "a construction favorable to the accused, and against the
State." 113

The Melgar court noted that the aim of enhanced
punishment is to target those who do not respond to rehabilitation.114 Identifying and punishing those who ''had been
accorded a fair chance at rehabilitation in the prison system and had not responded," is one of the goals of sentence enhancement statutes. 115
The Melgar court recognized the need to strictly interpret the statute due to its highly penal nature. 116 The
rule oflenity requires that when there is any doubt about
the exact punishment imposed by the statute, the court
should not interpret the statute in such a manner as to increase the penalty. 117
IV. THE IMPLICATION OF MELGAR
The Melgar decision generated strict guidelines for

Maryland's trial courts. It concluded that time spent by a
defendant in pretrial detention "may not be tacked on to
time served post-conviction in a term of confinement so
as to satisfy the 180-day predicate under section
286(d)(1 )(i)." 118 This was consistent with the desire of
the Legislature to "accord to a defendant a true opportunity and fair chance at rehabilitation before being sentenced
under the enhanced penalty statute." 119

The decision inMe/garreflects the recognition that
mandatory sentencing statutes are highly punitive. 120 It is
also demonstrative ofthe current reassessment ofmandatory sentencing. 121 The holding in Melgar reflects the
court's continued faith in the rehabilitative purpose of incarceration, and reaffirms the need to strictly construe
penal statutes. 122 This decision is indicative ofthe court's
concern over taking discretion away from the judges, and
the effectiveness and propriety of mandatory sentencing
ofnon-violent offenders. 123
The Melgar decision may be viewed as an anti-prosecution statement, since to some extent it decreases the
State's bargaining position. While time served before sentencing will count towards reducing actual time to be
served, 124 it will not count towards time needed to meet
the requisite 180 days. 125 Fewer defendants will qualify
for the enhanced sentence since it requires two prior convictions as well as a prior minimum period of incarceration of 180 days. 126
As a result, a class of defendants is created who,
despite extensive narcotics records, may not qualify for a
mandatory sentence, while defendants with less serious
records may. 127

V. MELGAR: RAMIFICATIONS IN THE WAKE
OF THE MANDATORY SENTENCING DEBATE.
The decision in Melgar raises issues that are at the
heart ofcontinuing discussions in the criminal justice community.128 The decision reflects frustration with an overwhelming drug problem, and society's re-evaluation ofthe
effectiveness of mandatory sentencing.
A. Judicial Frustrations
As a result of increased incarceration rates, prison
overcrowding, sentence disparities, and a strain on the
operation ofan otherwise beneficial system of sentencing
guidelines, 129 certain federal and state judges have expressed their opposition to mandatory sentencing. 130 Proliferation ofharsh mandatory sentences has driven some
judges to resign and others to openly voice their frustration.131
The opposition against mandatory sentencing was
discussed in the May 17, 1993 issue of the National Law
Journal. 132 The article noted that Jack B. Weinstein and
Whitman Knapp ofNew York are among fifty senior fed-
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eraljudges who, by May of 1993, had exercised their
prerogative to refuse to hear drug cases. 133 In other cases,
federal judges have found the defendant guilty ofthe possession oflesser amounts ofdrugs in order to circumvent
the mandatory sentences, or have raised the burden of
proof from a preponderance of the evidence standard to
a clear and convincing standard. 134
The trend to displace federal guidelines and impose
more lenient sentences continues to grow. 135 In 1999,
there were 55,000 criminal cases sentenced in the federal
courts, 136 but only 65% ofsentences fell within the guidelines. 137 When compared with figures over the last ten
years, this number has continued to increase. In 1989,
82% ofthe criminal cases were sentenced within the guidelines.138 In contrast, only 0.6% of the criminal cases sentenced in the federal courts in 1999 went above the guidelines.139 Even more alarming is the fact that the Department of Justice appealed only 19 of the 8,000 cases in
1999 that fell below the guidelines. 140
While individual judges have voiced dissatisfaction
with mandatory guidelines, "official judicial bodies have
not formally opposed them." 141 Resolutions for therepeal offederal mandatory minimum sentences have been
enacted by judges of every federal circuit court, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the American Bar
Association, and the Federal Court Study Committee. 142
B. Displacement of Violent Offenders
Critics also point out that when judges sentence offenders under mandatory sentences, prisons must make
room for these inmates. 143 This has been identified by
some as the cause ofmushrooming prison populations. 144
Aggressive use ofmandatory sentencing often results in
the early release ofviolent as well an nonviolent offenders
to make room for the growing number of drug offenders
being sentenced under these mandatory sentencing statutes.145
The release of violent offenders in order to make
room for drug offenders sentenced under the mandatory
statutes has proved counter-productive. 146 While police
officers are spending a disproportional amount oftheir time
chasing down drug offenders, less time is available to pursue other violent and nonviolent criminals. 147 It is possible
that legislatures are not considering these factors and other
repercussions when they enact mandatory sentences.
31.2 U. Bait L.F. 8

C. Results in Unwarranted Disparities
Mandatory sentencing does not provide consistent and proportional punishment. 148 Numbers indicate
that African-Americans are more frequently subjected to
mandatory sentencing than are white criminal offenders.
While 12% ofour population is African-American, almost
50% ofthe women and more than 50% of the men in
U.S. jails and prisons are African-American. 149 These
numbers are exacerbated by the growing use of zero tolerance policies that have the result of targeting minorities. 150 These policies, aimed at those who violate drug
and gun laws, target inner-city neighborhoods which tend
to be predominantlyminority. 151
Critics note that most of the drug offenders being
sentenced under these mandatory sentences, and receiving lengthy incarcerations, are low-level, non-violent offenders.152 The lowest level drug dealer standing on the
neighborhood street corner can receive the same punishment as the highest level member of that drug network.
Maryland's mandatory and enhanced sentence statutes do
not distinguish based on the severity of the crime. 153
D.Failure to Stem the Growth ofDrug Crimes
Mandatory sentencing statutes have failed to stem
the growth of crime in general, and drug crimes specifically. In 1980 there were 24,000 drug offenders in the
United States Bureau ofPrisons population.154 By 1993,
this number had grown to 90,000.155 Perhaps even more
alarming was the projection that this figure would grow to
130,000 by the year2000.156 In 1998, for the first time
more than one million men and women were incarcerated
in federal and state prisons for nonviolent crimes varying
from passing bad checks to dealing drugs. I 57
The Department ofJustice's Uniform Crime Report
shows a constant growth in crime in the nation.158 In
1988, the same year that the Maryland General Assembly imposed mandatory sentencing under Article 27, section 286(d) of the Maryland Code, 159 the total number
of arrests for crime index offenses was 7,945, 783.160
In 1997 this figure rose to 9,226,709, a 16.1% increase.l61 A breakdown of these figures shows that
during the same time period violent crime increased 23.3%,
while property crime decreased 7.6%162 More alarming
are the statistics on drug offenses. A total of659,616
men and women were arrested for drug abuse violations
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in 1988. 163 This figure increased 48.2% up to a staggering 977,789 people in 1997. 164 These figures indicate that
during the period of 1988 to 1997, the increase in drug
arrests was nearly three times that oftotal arrests in the
nation. 165
It is evident that despite existing mandatory sentencing statutes, the number ofarrests and convictions for drug
offenses continues to increase. In light of these figures, it
appears that toughened sentencing standards that incarcerate repeat drug offenders for longer periods oftime,
are not solving the problem.
E. Shift in Power and Discretion
Maryland's mandatory sentencing statutes have
shifted the power and discretion in sentencing from judges
to prosecutors 166 Issues of fairness arise under Maryland Rule 4-245(b), 167 when we consider that prosecutors are given the discretion to decide whether or not they
are going to seek an enhanced penalty. 168 In Beverly v.
State, 169 the Court ofAppeals ofMaryland held that "Ru1e
4-245 did not remove prosecutorial discretion to plea
bargain away a mandatory minimum subsequent offender
sentence." 170 The court further held that "the prosecutor
may validly choose not to meet the statutory conditions
by not giving notice and by not presenting evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has a prior conviction." 171 Rule 4-245 allows the
prosecutor discretion in plea-bargaining, while providing
the defendant with the opportunity to consider the consequences of pleading not guilty. 172 As a result, two drug
offenders, arrested for the exact same crime, could be
sentenced differently solely based on the discretion ofthe
prosecutor.
F Equal Protection Issue
Mandatory sentencing provisions are not invoked in
all instances, 173 and when they are, they are typically part
of a plea-bargaining strategy as evidenced by Beverly v.
State. 174 Between 1997 and 1999,judges have increasingly sentenced offenders below the guidelines. 175 This
discrepancy, dramatically noted in drug offenses, raises
important due process and equal protection issues. 176
There is considerable disparity in compliance with
the guidelines in drug cases. 177 Sentences that fall within
the guidelines range from 18.3% to 67.3%,t 78 while those

falling below the guidelines range from 10.3% to 79.9%. 179
In contrast with these numbers, sentences which were
above the guidelines ranged from 1.8% to 22.4%.
There is widespread disparity among the Maryland
circuits in sentencing within the guidelines. Overall compliance with the guidelines shows disparity in sentencing
between the circuits for all crimes, 180 not just for drug offenses.181 The disparity, however, is particularly dramatic
in sentencing for drug offenses. 182 When reviewing the
severity of sentencing in drug cases, it is evident that sentencing in the First,t 83 Second,t 84 and Fourth 185 Circuits,
the Eastern Shore and Western Maryland, appears tough
on drug offenders. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit, Baltimore City, is particularly lenient on its drug offenders. 186
These statistics show that mandatory guidelines and
sentence enhancement statutes are not being followed. 187
This variance in sentencing indicates a lack of consensus
in how to deal with the drug problem. 188 This analysis
raises the valid question ofwhy Maryland has "guidelines"
and "mandatories"189 when they are not applied uniformly
within the State. It may be inferred that there is a similar
disparity in the invocation ofmandatory sentencing provisions. There is no hard data on the percentage of cases
where the mandatory applies and was imposed.
Maryland's mandatory sentencing statutes have continued to receive mixed support with State prosecutors.
Carroll County's State's Attorney Jerry F. Barnes has
made it clear that his county ''will seek a mandatory sentence every time" it prosecutes a repeat drug offender. 190
SandraA. O'Connor, Baltimore County State's Attorney
views Maryland's mandatory sentences as an effective tool
forprosecutors} 91 Anne Arundel County State's Attorney Frank R. Weathersbee also supports the legislature's
continuing move toward mandatory sentencing, as does
Harford County State'sAttorney Joseph I. Cassilly. 192 But
an examination of the statistics in Baltimore City implies
that the State's Attorney Patricia Jessamy, does not seem
to support mandatory statutes. 193
In response to dramatic and uncontrolled increases
in violent crime and drug dealing, mandatory sentences
have been enacted. 194 While prosecutors have supported
mandatory sentences, some judges have voiced displeasure because they limit a judge's discretion and ability to
consider each case and each sentence individually. 195
Many agree that dangerous murderers, armed rob31.2 U. Bait. L.F. 9
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hers, sex offenders, and other violent offenders should be
off the streets, out of society, and in prison. Beginning
with America's War on Drugs, nonviolent drug offenders
have been added to this list. Since the 1980's, there has
been a drive toward tougher sentences for drug crimes,
including mandatory sentences. 196
VII. CONCLUSION
While the Court ofAppeals ofMa:ryland's decision in Melgar serves as one interpretation ofthe mandatory sentencing statue 197 it also underscores the failure of
the statute to deter the drug related offenses it was designed to address. 198
Many states, including Maryland, have followed
the example ofthe federal government and have adopted
strict mandatory enhanced sentences for drug offenders. 199
However, despite these new statutes, drug arrests continue to increase. 200 Thus, a conclusion can be inferred
that the imposition or threat of severe mandatory penalties for repeated violations ofthe drug laws has had little,
ifany, significant impact on crime rates, particularly drug
offenses.201
While not every drug defendant qualifies for the
enhanced sentence under Article 27, section 286(d) of
the Maryland Code, not all jurisdictions are applying the
law to every defendant who qualifies. 202 Sentencing in
drug cases varies dramatically from circuit to circuit, as
does, by inference, the invocation of mandatory sentences.203 Circuits should, at the very least, strive for uniformity. This does not mean that mandatory sentencing
statutes are inappropriate, or that they should be repealed.
Rather, a continued increase in crime indicates that the
law is not solving the problems for which it was intended204
If drug offenses have not decreased in the eleven years
since the statute was added to the Maryland Code, they
will not decrease in the next eleven years. The Maryland
General Assembly needs to look towards another solution.
Mandatory sentencing provisions fail to address
the economics ofthe drug trade. While the imprisonment
ofa violent criminal may work to deter crime, the imprisonment of one drug dealer neither deters drug offenses
nor diminishes the availability of drugs for long. The economics of drugs are a classic reflection of supply and demand. Remove one drug dealer from the streets and sup31.2 U. Bait L.F.JO

ply is diminished only for a short time. Demand continues, and there are other dealers ready, willing and able to
take over. Destroy one drug network and another moves
in to take its place. As long as there is a demand for
drugs, there will be someone to supply it.
Mandatory sentencing provisions also do not take
into account the fact that not all drug dealers are the same,
nor are all drug dealers violent. Drug dealers vary from
the big time supplier who will resort to violence to maintain his market, to the street level dealer who deals to
support a habit. There are dealers of various types, and
enforcers who utilize force and violence to protect their
turf. While not all drug dealers fit the same profile or impose the same threat to society, all can be subjected to
the same mandatory sentencing provisions.
This is not to suggest that mandatory sentencing is
not appropriate in certain circumstances. There are certain violators who do pose a serious threat to society and
need to be incarcerated for significant periods of time.
However, a "one-size fits all" approach to sentencing in
drug cases, even for repeat violators, has not, and will
not, work to deter the drug epidemic.
It may be time to consider the possibility that a
drug-free society is impossible. 205 It may be time to ask
why legislatures continue to pass statutes that fail to demolish the growth of the drug trade. 206 It may be time to
look more seriously at the idea that we need to treat the
drug problem as a health problem. 207
Drug dealers would not exist if it were not for the
drug addicts. It therefore seems clear that a major part of
any anti-drug effort needs to focus on eliminating the demand of addicts. This can only occur through intensive
treatment and aftercare. Mandatory need not always mean
imprisonment. The term can also be used in conjunction
with treatrnent. 208
It is unrealistic to view mandatory sentencing, with
its attendant problems of prosecutorial discretion, lack of
judicial discretion, and inconsistent implementation, as the
sole answer to the drug epidemic. For whatever reason,
these statutes have not stemmed the course of the drug
problem. At the very least, passage and continued implementation of such measures needs to be re-evaluated.
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